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THE NO-WAR CLAUSE IN THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION
P. ALLAN DIONISOPOULOSt
I.
The principle of self-defense was a precept of the ius naturale and
ius gentium, and is universally recognized as an inherent right1 in inter-
national law. Yet in the Twentieth Century this right has been modi-
fied2 as the result of a new concept of war; a concept which placed war
in roughly two categories referred to by the Church Fathers8 as "just"
and "unjust." This idea is reflected in such wartime phrases as, "God
is on our side." The effective alliance with the Supreme Being gives a
moral basis to the nation which has already accepted alliance with the
pseudo-deity, Mars. Prevailing in righteous struggle (two world wars)
the victors believed that they had received the right to impose limitations
on sovereignty.
The precedent of restricting sovereignty, established in 1919," was
even further elaborated at the conclusion of World War I. The Potsdam
Proclamation demanded much more than mere restrictions on armaments
and troops; it was a plan to destroy completely and for all time the mili-
t Department of Government, Indiana University. The writer wishes to express
his indebtedness to Professor Edward Beuhrig of the Department of Government, Indiana
University, for reading the manuscript and making valuable suggestions. The writer
accepts sole responsibility for the facts and points of view contained in this paper.
1. This principle is recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. Article 51
states, "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense ... "
2. There is an analogy in that an individual can also lose his "inalienable rights,"
through "due process of law." However, the procedural aspects at the international
level differ considerably from those of municipal law.
3. This concept was resuscitated from the earlier Roman doctrine and embellished
with Christian teachings by St. Augustine and Archbishop Isidore. In the Middle Ages
other Church Fathers, St. Thomas Aquinas, Francisco Vitoria, and Francisco Suarez,
elaborated upon the doctrine of a just war. See NussBAUM, A CONcIsE HISTORY OF
THE LAW OF NATIONS (1950) pamsint.
4. This is not to deny that the exchange of real estate and payment of tribute were
not restrictions on sovereignty. However, the pattern of imposing restrictions upon the
number of men under arms and the type of weapons and implements of war, as found
in the Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Neuilly and Trianon, was a new concept.
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tary capacity of Japan.' It was one thing to impose limitations on a na-
tion's military potential, but quite another thing to carry the program
through to its completion, and, as was the case for the treaties concluded
after the earlier war, the success of a program of this nature depended on
many factors. If the objectives of the Potsdam Declaration were to be
achieved, the victorious powers had to be willing to police the defeated
nation; the policing function, in turn, depended on domestic politics and
international relations.6 Between September 1945 (Japanese Surrender)
and September 1951 (Japanese Peace Treaty) the relations between the
non-Communist and Communist nations deteriorated. The "cold war"
had changed the international situation so that former enemies (Ger-
many, Japan, and Italy) were now friends and a former ally (Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics) became an enemy.
Although the Peace Treaty did not place any restrictions on Japan's
military capacity, Article 9 of the American-sponsored Showa Constitu-
tion (1947) did.7 The new Constitution was drafted in SCAP's s Govern-
ment Section, under the direction of Major General Courtney Whitney,
and presented to the Japanese Diet as a Government-supported draft. It
is not difficult to understand the confusion which reigned in official
circles, especially since the Japanese had created a committee to revise the
Meiji Constitution in accordance with the stipulations of the Potsdam
Proclamation. Although the responsibility for pushing the draft through
the Diet fell upon the Prime Minister, Shigeru Yoshida, and his Cabinet
members, and thus gave the document the character of a Government
product, the "source" of the Constitution was unquestionable.9 It had
5. See points 6, 7, and 9 in the Potsdam Proclamation; 13 DE,'T STATE BULL. 423
(1945). A durable program was envisaged in the Byrnes-suggested Four Power Pact. It
was proposed that the Big Four (United States, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., and China)
conclude a twenty-five year mutual assistance program to implement the disarmament
provision in the Proclamation. 14 id. at 1113-14 (1946) ; and see Nippon Times, May 1,
1946.
6. What better example is there than that of the Petite Entente (Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia, and Rumania). Observance of the provisions restricting sovereignty
were enforced upon Hungary and Bulgaria until the rise of Nazi Germany changed the
picture in Central Europe and made further policing impossible. The domestic scene
had also changed with the advent of fascistic parties in Bucharest and Belgrade.
7. "Aspiring to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people
forever renounce war as a sovereign righty of the nation and the threat or use of force
as means of settling international disputes.
"In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces
as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerancy of the
state will not be recognized." JAPAN CONST., ch. II, art. 9.
8. Supreme Command (also Commander) for the Allied Powers.
9. At the Senate (MacArthur) Hearings in 1951, the deposed General stated that
the clause was included at the suggestion of Baron Shidehara, who died a short time
before the hearing. However, former Prime Minister Hitoshi Ashida (who had been
chairman of the Constitutional Committee in the House of Representatives when the
document was taken under consideration) announced in 1953 that the Allies wanted to
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a distinctly Anglo-American flavor, convincing many that it had been
drafted in the English language and then translated into Japanese. But
Article 9 was not a reflection of Western political thought or practice."
In it SCAP had erected a safeguard that promised permanence-a per-
manence that was not available in treaties.
No provision of the Constitution received more consideration than
this clause which renounced war as a sovereign right. In the five months
in which the two chambers" discussed the draft, Prime Minister Yoshida
was confronted with the perpetual question, "Who will protect us when
the occupation forces are withdrawn ?"2 On these occasions the Prime
Minister emphasized the importance of Article 9 "as a great feature of
the document." If he was as apprehensive as his fellow legqslators, he
did not reveal it in the question hours. Shigeru Yoshida resorted to
high-sounding phrases in entrusting his nation's security to the "fair
play and good faith of the world," while Japan moved in the "vanguard
of peace-loving nations on the highroad to justice."'
make sure that Japan would never "come back as a military power" and that the wish
of the victorious nations was expressed in Article 9. See Nippon Times, March 1, 1953.
Ashida may have had knowledge on this subject which is not presently available to
interested students of Japanese politics.
And former Prime Minister Yoshida stated, "I myself think it . . . came from
General MacArthur's point of view. .. " Yoshida's Memoirs, Part IV, Asahi Shimbun,
July 29, 1955.
There are a number of excellent studies covering this period. These include: BALL,
JAPAN, ENEMY OF ALLY? (1949) ; BLAKESLEE, THE FAR EASTERN CoMMIssION, 1945-1952
(1953) ; QUIGLEY AND TURNER, THE NEW JAPAN (1956); SCAP (Government Section),
POLITicAL REORIENTATION OF JAPAN, SEPTEMBER 1945 to SEPTEMBER 1948 (1949); and
WILDE, TYPHOON IN TOKYO (1954). Each of these writers had a first hand knowledge
of the events surrounding the drafting and adoption of the Showa Constitution. Blakeslee
and Wilde, recognized American scholars on the Far East, were members of the Far
Eastern Commission and SCAP's Government Section respectively, and Ball was the'
Commonwealth representative on the Allied Council.
10. Ashida did note that on two previous occasions other nations had incorporated
clauses renouncing aggressive war, the French Constitution of 1791, and Brazil's
Constitution of 1891. But no nation had "ever stipulated total abolition of armament
and total repudiation of war. In this sense it is unique in the history of the world."
See Nippon Times, Aug. 18, 1946. It should be recalled that France did engage in a
very bitter "defensive" war at that time.
11. The pre-war legislative arrangement prevailed until the new Constitution was
in force in May 1947. Thus the older House of Peers (much like the House of Lords,
but without the traditions and limitations that have made the latter a functioning body
in a democracy), by agreeing to the change in institutions, voted itself out of existence.
It was replaced by a new upper chamber called the House of Councillors. Since Japan
is a unitary state, the new upper chamber is more like the Italian than the American
Senate. Approximately one-half of its membership is elected at large. The remainder
are elected in individual districts. It has powers comparable to those of the Italian
upper chamber, but cannot cause the defeat of the Government.
12. For accounts of various "question hours," see the Nippon Times, June 20, 21,
26, 28, and July 5, 1946; the OFFIcIAL GAzETTE, Extra, June 27, 28, 29, and Aug. 26, 1946.
The Official Gazette is the account of proceedings in the House of Representatives
and the House of Peers. The journal was published in English during occupation years.
13. Nippon Times, June 26. 1946.
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The security-minded legislators wanted something more than mere
words, and they began looking about for an adequate safeguard. On
several occasions interpellators raised the question of finding security
within the framework of the United Nations. Questions in this vein
indicated either an ignorance of the Charter provisions, or an erroneous
inference. Obviously the Government could not give a definite answer
to these suggestions, but Government spokesmen found it convenient to
dangle before the Diet the hope of the United Nations. Yoshida told
the legislators his Government was reassured by the principle upon which
the international organization was built, that is, its basic function, the
maintenance of international peace and security. Such reasoning by any
and all Japanese was fallacious, since the fulfillment of the goals en-
visioned in the San Francisco Conference in 1945, depended upon much
more than mere moral support.14
In spite of the many questions raised on the important problem of
self defense, 5 the Constitution was adopted by overwhelming majorities
in each chamber.'" The promulgation of the new Constitution was ac-
companied by an Imperial exhortation to the people to live up to the
14. In the meetings of the Constitution Committee of the lower chamber, Chairman
Hitoshi Ashida had suggested that the renunciation of war was a necessary first step to
membership in the United Nations. Other legislators believed that Japan would not be
admitted to membership because she could not fulfill the obligations of membership.
One of the strangest arguments advanced at that time was that the nation would find
security within the United Nations with the Security Council taking over Japan's
defense and perhaps permitting Japan appropriate measures of self defense. A strange
argument indeed-look to an external force for permission to do that which is within
the power of a sovereign nation!
15. The Cooperative Democrats openly reflected the insecurity of their compatriots
by suggesting an amendment to the draft which would include a statement on the right
to self defense. The Party spokesman, Heima Haryashi, noted that "judgment day"
was coming, the day when Japan would be independent; but could an independent Japan
survive if, in the renunciation of war, she also renounced the right of self defense. Later
the Cooperative Democratic Party recommended that the principle of renunciation be
incorporated into the Preamble, and exclude it from the operative part of the text.
Nippon Times, July 12, 1946. If this suggestion had been adopted, it would have saved
the Japanese Government many painful moments in later years when it was necessary
to "interpret" the constitutional prohibition to create a self defense force. After all,
the Preamble of any constitution is an appropriate catch-all, housing those goals which
cannot be achieved immediately.
A strong opponent in the House of Peers, Dr. Sasaki, told the Government that if
Japan believed that war was immoral, "she could do well to refrain from waging one,
without going to the length of making a declaration to that effect." For the account of
his statements to the House of Councillors see the Nippon Times, Aug. 30, 1946.
16. Only eight Representatives voted against adoption of the Constitution in the
lower chamber. One of these, an Independent, voted against adoption because he be-
lieved that the Constitution was not "sufficiently pacifistic." He wanted "concrete
guarantees against all wars." The lower chamber adopted the draft on August 26, 1946.
See Nippon Times, Aug. 27, 1946.
The House of Peers adopted the draft on October 7, 1946, and amendments which
it proposed were adopted by the House of Representatives without debate.
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obligation which they had accepted in renouncing war. On the same
occasion Prime Minister Yoshida noted the pride of his fellow country-
men in taking the lead. And a few months later, the Supreme Com-
mander, General MacArthur, reported:
The renunciation of war is a unique feature of the new Con-
stitution. Born out of the bitter experience of war and defeat,
this provision bears the impress of the modern conception that
mankind constitutes a unity. It renounces the right of bel-
ligerency and forbids development of the means to wage war
as the only effective curb on war. Here, for the first time in
history, a national state thus offers specific and absolute guar-
antees of peaceful intention, not only to its own people, but to
the world at large. The moral significance of his renuncia-
tion is self-evident.
The permanent total abolition of armed forces is a logical
result of the renunciation of war. This, too, is an innovation
in the history of constitutions."
The clause renouncing -war, indeed the whole constitution, is en-
shrouded in contradictions. The victorious powers wanted to mold
Japan into a democracy by imposing Western democratic institutions
on the Japanese and to create a "peace loving" nation by destroying all
vestiges of the war machine. External supervision (the Occupation
Forces) was necessary to guarantee acceptance of these two ideals. Yet
in each instance it was essential to maintain the myth that the Constitu-
tion was "established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the
Japanese people. ... ""
17. SCAP, Two YEARs oF OCcupATI N, Part 2 (Political), Appendix I, p. 28 (1947).
In a report to Congress in 1947, General MacArthur stated that the Japanese renounced
all rights to belligerency and "placed their full reliance for future protection on the
good faith and justice of mankind." There is not the slightest hint of a measure of
self defense in this message. It was obvious that the implementation of the clause
depended on foreign powers, not Japan. See General Douglas MacArthur's Message to
the U.S. Congress, 16 CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 107 (1947).
18. Potsdam Declaration (12). The principles which were to guide Japanese
political development were provided in the Potsdam Proclamation; the United States,
along with the other member nations of the Far Eastern Commission, were committed
to the creation of a democratic Japan. It would seem that the engrafting of alien institu-
tions on an unfamiliar culture would not be a wise first step toward the development of
a democratic nation; institutions are not a guarantee of such development. It is still
doubtful whether some individuals in high official capacities realize that a democracy
can only exist where there are "democrats;" the cultural and psychological factors
being as important as, or perhaps more important than, the democratic institutions.
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II.
Article 9 was a milestone on the highway of idealism. The wisdom
of the clause was not challenged immediately after its adoption. On the
third anniversary of the Japanese surrender, General MacArthur could
still say that the practical weapons which were needed to check the to-
talitarian advance-liberty, dignity, and opportunity-rested safely "in
every Japanese hand, and the nation has thereby become an asset upon
which the free world may confidently count."19 But questions came for-
ward with increasing rapidity as the "cold war" emerged on the inter-
national scene; liberty, dignity, and opportunity are fine weapons, but,
unfortunately, the world was not ready to substitute these for another
triad-the army, navy, and air force. The Japanese were in a quandry;
they recognized the change which had taken place as a result of the cold
war. The change threatened to engulf Japan, and some Japanese be-
lieved -that the nation should prepare an adequate defense; others were
opposed to any form of rearmament.2"
The first step toward self defense was the creation in 1950 of a
military police force, the National Police Reserve.2  The force, com-
prising 75,000 men, was organized to preserve order and peace and
supplement the powers of the rural and municipal civil police forces.
This was but the first of a host of plans and programs which could be
considered a violation of the Constitution in view of the terms of Article
9. The clause was a contradiction of prevailing world practice, and the
Government's slow but steady progress toward a rebuilt military force
was a contradiction of Article 9. The Government, while rearming the
nation, denied that it was rearming. The question of constitutionality
was raised frequently, but on each occasion Yoshida responded that the
Constitution prohibited the use of arms to settle an international dis-
pute, whereas all efforts by the Government were aimed only at increas-
ing the nation's security.
The Showa Constitution provided for judicial review (one of its
many eclectic features)." But Japanese jurisprudence was more com-
19. See General Douglas MacArthur's Statement Issued on the Third Anniversary
of V-J Day, September 2, 1948, 17 CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 415 (1948).
20. At the 1953 Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in Honolulu, Dr.
Shiroshi Nasu, Chairman of the Japanese Delegation, reported that there was a genuinely
pacifistic neutrality in Japan. See his statement in REISCHATJER, JAPAN AND A WmICA
TODAY (1953).
21. At the 1951 Hearings General MacArthur informed the Senators that the
National Police Reserve was regarded, at its inception, as a defense force which could
be readily converted into something more substantial. See New York Times, May 28, 1951.
22. The power of judicial review is an explicit power, not an implied one. JAPAN
CONST., ch. 6, art. 81. For a discussion of the Japanese courts see Tanaka, Democratization
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patible with German positivism than Anglo-American assumptions about
law; Japan lacked an essential to the full implementation of the provision
for judicial review, i.e., the "higher law" background of the English-
speaking world. However, at least one political force availed itself of
this constitutional provision in an attempt to prevent the rebirth of mili-
tarism in Japan. The Socialists decided to push the issue to its climax,
and on March 15, 1952, the Party leadership brought a test case to the
Supreme Court. They contended that the National Police Reserve Act
was invalid. At the first hearings the Socialists charged that the organi-
zation was unconstitutional because the National Police Reserve (1) was
purely military, (2) possessed equipment which was "war potential" 23
material, and (3) was scheduled to be converted into a "defense force." '24
The Supreme Court did not give its decision until October 1952.
In the meantime, two important events had taken place: In April 1952
the United States Senate gave its consent to ratification of the Japanese
Peace Treaty, and Japan was restored as a free and independent nation
on April 28; national elections were held and the Yoshida Liberals won
a resounding victory." The Court rejected the Socialists' suit with a
declaration by Chief Justice Tanaka that the suit was "abstract" and the
Court was not competent to give a decision on the purely theoretical issue
of whether the National Police Reserve was "an army" or "military
potential." The Court thus limited its power to determine the validity
of laws.
The left-wing Socialist, Inomato, Chairman of the Party's Laws and
Regulations Committee, charged that the Government had applied pres-
sure on the Court.2" If the Socialist's charge was true, then the Japanese
judiciary missed an opportunity to assert its independence.27 On the
other hand, the Japanese judiciary may have discovered more quickly
than its American counterpart, that the ballot, an important expression
of Japanese Administration of Justice, in JAPAN'S PROBLEMS (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (Tokyo), Public Information and Cultural Affairs Bureau, 1954).
23. This is a nebulous and non-descript phrase found in Article 9. It was used
frequently in debates, but rarely defined. On one occasion when the Attorney-General,
Kimura, was answering questions along this line in the upper chamber, a Socialist,
Kanae Hatano, suggested that Japan could "possess military [power] provided it is
short of power to wage a modern and aggressive war such as the Pacific War." Kimura
answered, "Yes, from a legal standpoint."
24. Nippon Times, May 15, June 12, 1952.
25. Yoshida's victory was especially noteworthy in that Japan has a multi-party
system, and in this election, the depurged Ichiro Hatoyama wooed some of the Liberals
away from the Prime Minister. Hatoyama had been the head of the Liberal Party until
purged by SCAP in 1946, and Yoshida refused to resign when the former was depurged.
26. Nippon Times, Oct. 9, 1952.
27. Article 76 of the Constitution provides for judicial independence, a distinct
departure from earlier Japanese practice.
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of popular will, perhaps should bind the judiciary as well as the other
two branches of government.
Yoshida seemed insecure and uncertain on the constitutional ques-
tion and made costly "slips of the tongue," which his political opponents
were quick to exploit for political gain. Even the principle of self de-
fense, a recognized inherent right of every sovereign nation, did not
give the Prime Minister any great solace. On one occasion Yoshida told
the Budget Committee of the House of Councillors that the possession of
a "war potential" did not constitute a violation of the clause renouncing
war.2" As a result of this statement, the issue of constitutional revision
became a question of major political importance, and some parties, such
as the Hatoyama faction of the Liberal Party and groups within the
Right-Socialist and Progressive Parties,29 pressed for an immediate re-
vision." The heated debate forced Yoshida to retract his unfortunate
statement. At the same time he admitted that rearming, even for self
defense, was rearming nevertheless, and therefore called for an amended
constitution.1 But in doing so, Yoshida emphasized two points: (1) that
the economic situation prohibited immediate rearmament, and (2) that
the Constitution should be changed only when the Japanese people showed
their desire for a rearmament program. 2
Throughout this period Yoshida verbally supported Article 9 and
even warned the nation against hasty revision of the Constitution "be-
cause it was adopted with such firm determination." It would be a great
error, however, to think that Yoshida was disposed to pay as much at-
tention to constitutional considerations as do the heads of governments
in the Western world. The Japanese had little understanding of the
Western concept of constitutionalism. Japan's first constitution, the
Meiji Constitution, was clearly not a constitution in the true sense of
that term. It was a "gift" to a subject people from an unfettered sov-
ereign, rather than a document which was imposed on the government by
a sovereign people. The Meiji Constitution was an organic act but not
28. Nippon Times, March 8, 1952.
29. Hitoshi Ashida, political advisor to the Progressive Party, concurred with
the Government's policy and stated he did not see any need for revision. Ashida had been
the leader of the Democratic Party, forerunner of the Progressives, and Prime Minister,
but his Party had been involved in scandal and corruption, thereby forcing him out of
active politics. He was subsequently cleared by the courts.
30. The Left-Socialist, Labor-Farmer, and Communist Parties opposed revision
and rearmament in any form. Nippon Times, March 10, 1952.
31. This was interesting in light of later governmental policies which, without
constitutional revision, brought into being an armed force. At this time, however, Yoshida
said, "To have a 'war potential' even for self-defense, means rearmament and requires
revision of the Constitution. I wish to reiterate my earlier statements that this country
will not rearm."
32. Nippon Times, March 10, 1952.
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a fundamental law, and pre-war Japanese Governments did not have to
observe restrictions of a constitutional nature. Yoshida's support for
the constitution was primarily geared to Japan's economic situation; her
economy could not sustain huge military outlays. In fact, the Prime
Minister referred so often to the latter factor that it seemed to be far
more important than the constitutional provision. When the Prime
Minister combined the constitutional and economic factors, he found
formidable allies.
American interest in these developments cannot be underestimated.
As was manifested in the Peace Treaty and in discussions which preceded
the restoration of sovereignty, Washington no longer thought in terms
of a helpless Japan.33 The United States' changed attitude was evident
in the material support which was offered to Japan. The economic fac-
tor had been so frequently stressed by Prime Minister Yoshida that, if
Japan's military force was to be strengthened, material aid was an ab-
solute necessity. This material support provided Yoshida with a very
cogent reason to push the defense program, and certainly it removed one
of the blocks which he had erected. The constitutional prohibition re-
mained, and it was Yoshida's responsibility to reconcile the defense ma-
chinery with Article 9.
Yoshida made an elaborate study of the nation's security needs and
then in January 1952 introduced a bill to increase by 35,000 the man-
power of the National Police Reserve. The bill brought forth the usual
questions on constitutionality; the most appropriate defense the Govern-
ment could find was to describe the defense corps' mission as exclusively
internal." The government's victory on this bill stimulated new defense
measures which could be passed within the barrier of Article 9. On
August 1, 1952, the National Safety Force, a unified security force,
which included the National Police Reserve, was formed. To emphasize
the civilian control feature, the National Safety Force was headed by a
33. For example, in late 1953, Vice President Nixon, on a Far Eastern tour, told
the America-Japan Society that the United States was ready to admit that it bad made
a mistake in advising "Japan to forego the maintenance of a military force." He was
not the first to do so. Americans began to bring pressures on the Japanese to rearm
shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War. See Nixon, To the Japanese People,
22 CONiTEmPORARY JAPAN 371 (1953). Others, e.g., Dulles, Admiral Carney, and General
Eichelberger, followed suit. See their statements in Nippon Times, Nov. 20, 21, and 26,
1953.
34. Takeo Ohashi used this as a means to calm the fears of the legalistic-minded
on the left. He had been the Attorney-General but relinquished that portfolio and
assumed the responsibility for developing the Japanese defense forces. He once told the
Diet that the NPR was much like a regular army, except that the former would not
serve overseas, but other than that the police reserve was "better trained than the
defunct Japanese army" and was "virtually the same as a military organization." Nippon
Times, Jan. 10, 1952.
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civilian, and the land and sea units were led by civilian inspector-generals
who supervised the chiefs of staff. 5 Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida
became the first chairman of the National Safety Board. The occasion
was marked by appropriate ceremonies and comments by the new chair-
man. As usual Yoshida's comments were fuel for the political fires. He
called the National Police Reserve the "cornerstone of a new Japanese
army," and he instructed the officers to make it the foundation of a
new "democratic army.13 6
Although for different reasons, parties from extreme left to con-
servative right criticized the Prime Minister's statements. The Left-
Socialist Party opposed anything that smacked of a rebirth of militarism,
while on the conservative side of the Diet, Progressive Party leader
Shigemitsu claimed that the speech was tantamount to an admission that
the Prime Minister wanted to rearm the nation without revising the Con-
stitution." In building up the defense machinery Prime Minister Yo-
shida needed the support of the other two conservative parties, but the
Government proposals seldom went as far as the Hatoyama and Shige-
mitsu factions were willing to go." Whenever the Government sub-
mitted a new defense measure, the other two parties voted for it; but
the personality struggle continued, and there was no strong unifying
force that could hold the three parties together for any great length of
time. The Hatoyama Liberals and the Shigemitsu Progressives were
ready to attack the Government Party at any given moment. These two
leaders were in favor of a rearmed Japan, and they believed that the best
way to achieve this was by a frontal assault on the constitutional pro-
hibitions. Since they could not persuade the Prime Minister to join
them in any effort to revise the Constitution they were ready to join with
political brethren of the extreme left to destroy Yoshida. 9
35. The civilian control feature was agreed upon by the Cabinet and stressed in
presenting the proposal to the Diet. See Nippon Times, April 5, 1952.
36. Nippon Times, Aug. 5, 1952. Yoshida put his "trademark" on the speech, i.e.,
immediately after making these comments, he warned that the economy would not permit
rearming, and revision of the Constitution would have to precede rearming. The opposi-
tion overlooked this portion of his speech.
37. Nippon Times, Aug. 9, 1952.
38. Both men had been purged by the occupation authorities. Shigemitsu had
been convicted as a war criminal, but was depurged in 1951, and moved back into political
circles by creating the Progressive Party out of the scandal-ridden Democratic Party.
Ichiro Hatoyama had been the leader of the Liberal Party, but in May 1946, when he
was about to take office as Prime Minister, Hatoyama was placed on the purge list, and,
according to his later statements, had entrusted the party to Yoshida. When depurged,
he discovered that Yoshida was more than a "caretaker"; the Party was his.
39. An example of this alignment occurred after Tokutaro Kimura, the Director-
General of the Safety Board, made an address in July 1953 in which he spoke of a
"five year defense program." Since this was the first public announcement of the
program, the opposition parties, acting in concert, demanded an opportunity to look over
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There was another significant development at this time: Former
military officers began to take an active role in planning for Japan's de-
fense needs, especially for the development of an air security force. The
former officers wanted to schedule two three year plans; the goal of the
first three year plan would be a force of 800 planes, and the second three
year program would end with a fleet of 3000 planes. The National
Safety Board rejected this plan as premature. The Board was content
with a fleet of light planes which had been leased from the United
States, although it did expect to increase the force to 120 planes by June
1953. The Board believed that the Government should not begin any
program to expand the air facility because of the limited economic capa-
city of the nation.4" In fact, when the budget was submitted in January
1953, the amount suggested for defense was 20% less than' that of 1952.
These various activities undertaken by the Japanese in 1952 indi-
cated that the nation was well on its way to rearming."' But by comparing
Japan's annual appropriation for national defense with that of the United
States, Italy, and the United Kingdom, the Prime Minister found a way
to deny that he was rearming the nation. He concluded that it was
laughable for his political opponents to accuse him of rearming; two
hundred billion yen did not, in his estimation, constitute a rearmament
budget.42
In June 1953 the U.S. Congress enacted the Mutual Security Act
which allowed for Japanese participation. This was to be of great sig-
nificance to the Japanese in their defense build up. The Japanese Gov-
ernment had hinted that it would be willing to enter into negotiations
with the United States and that it would prepare a new defense plan, if
the provisions of the reported plan. Just a few days after the speech was made, the
Budget Committee of the lower house approved a resolution requesting that the plans
be laid before it. The Diet demands were met with contradictory statements by the
Government; Kimura finally admitted that the plan was still in the study stage, and
that the Safety Board had not formally submitted it to the Government for its consider-
ation. Thereafter the Government refused each demand on the ground that the "disputed
program" was "merely a 'tentative plan.'" Nippon Times, July 5, 1953. Yoshida did
tell the Budget Committee that his Cabinet was studying a plan "to gradually increase
the strength of the National Safety Force," but the time had "not yet ripened" to reveal
it. Nippon Times, July 1, 1953.
40. The officer's plan would have called for an annual outlay of 200 billion yen.
See Nippon Times, Dec. 31, 1952.
41. This changing situation was illustrated by three articles which appeared in
the August 14, 1952 issue of the Nippon Times. These reported that Japanese shipyards
were building small warships for foreign nations, that Japanese industrialists had
established a new arms plant, and an association of arms producers had been set up.
42. Nippon Times, Sept. 2, 1952. Yoshida cited Italy specifically, since the Italian
Government was also a defeated power, but was now trying to rebuild its national
armed forces by spending four times as much of its national income for defense as did
the Japanese Government. The 1952-1953 budget had earmarked only 3.4% of the
national income on defense.
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necessary, in order to receive American aid. 3 When this information
was given to the Diet by Kimura, it touched off a new debate. On this
occasion a Progressive, Hideji Kawasaki, laid two defense plans before
his fellow legislators and claimed that one of these was Kimura's "five
year plan" and the other, which Kawasaki labelled Plan "A,"" was re-
portedly prepared by Japanese ex-officers, "or by American authorities."
The plans were significant not only for the proposed military expansion,
but also because of the allegation that Americans had helped in their
drafting. The plans raised the usual Article 9 questions, and the anti-
Americanism of the leftist factions was visible in the debates. The
Foreign Minister, Katsuo Okazaki, admitted that a study was in progress
to determine the effect which United States' aid would have on the re-
nunciation of' war clause45 but none of the Government spokesmen was
willing to acknowledge that a constitutional revision might be necessary
under the provisions of the assistance program.
It was rather apparent that acceptance of aid would mean radical
changes in the Safety Force. According to some Japanese officials its
name, character, status, and purpose would be revised.46 The Prime
Minister quickly denied that there would be a change in military defense
policy. However, in trying to resolve policy statements, Yoshida
wrapped himself in policy reversal. Even though he had earlier stated
that the function of the Safety Force was to quiet internal disturbances,
he now told the Diet that it was only natural, in the event of an external
attack, that the security forces take action. Within a month there was
more evidence to indicate a trend of giving the National Safety Force
the added duty of external defense; Ogata made public plans which
called for an increase in the number of men and which showed that the
Government was cognizant of the need to change the character of the
forces. There was a general belief in Japan that these plans were the
43. Nippon Times, July 1, 1953.
44. Plan "A" called for a navy of light carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines,
and air groups trained in fleet air operations. The "five year plan" was similar, although
it favored fewer ships and did not include any recommendations for a carrier program
nor a naval air arm.
If the first was an American plan, it was a significant departure from previous
policy. Up to this time the only ships which the United States had leased to Japan had
been smaller vessels ranging up to destroyers.
45. None of the Government spokesmen were willing to admit that the plans were
considered, or authorized by the Government, nor would it admit to Japanese or American
authorship.
46. Nippon Times, July 19, 1953. This could have meant that the defense forces
would be responsible for more than "internal" defense of the nation. Also see Nippon
Times, July 31, 1953.
47. Yoshida also expressed an opinion that the obligation, which Japan would
assume under the Mutual Security program, would not lead to any change in the
status quo, and therefore his Government did not contemplate any change in policy.
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direct result of American pressures. Indeed a conference between Secre-
tary of State John Foster Dulles and Prime Minister Yoshida had taken
place just previous to this announcement.
The constitutional problem constantly loomed before the Japanese.
Up to this time the Government had filled the ranks with volunteers, but
a now-contemplated force of over 150,000 men might require a conscrip-
tion program and this would not be a simple matter without revision of
the Constitution. The Government was in a dilemma; it was necessary
for domestic political reasons4" to maintain the fiction of Article 9; at
the same time, the Yoshida Government had to provide an increase in
military manpower to offset the progressive withdrawal of American
security troops. Washington had announced that all American troops
would be withdrawn within five years, and the announcement was backed
by determination. Yoshida realized that this was an invitation to get the
Japanese defensive program in high gear. The Americans could never
suggest, however, what was to be done with the constitutional prohibi-
tion. 9 Faced with this situation, the Government had to call upon an
international law precept, the right of a sovereign nation to defend it-
self, to justify the course of action it had decided to pursue. The Prime
Minister had announced in the past that provisions for self defense would
have to be preceded by constitutional revision; suddenly Yoshida dis-
covered that the words and phrases in Article 9 did not preclude self
defense."
In late 1953 the conservative parties acted in concert to change the
name, character, and functions of the National Safety Force. The three
conservative parties made plans for a long-range defense program to
bring about an increase in Japanese troops in proportion to the decrease
in American forces." In October 1953, on the first anniversary of the
National Safety Force, Yoshida told the Japanese people that the nation
would have to rearm "in the future" to safeguard its sovereign inde-
pendence, but, because of economic factors, the Japanese would have to
be satisfied with the National Safety Force.
48. The Socialist opposition to rearming was as strong as the two conservative
parties' demands for rearming and revision. Yoshida tried to walk the middle plank
between these two.
49. Senator Knowland told the Japanese that a Constitution could not "prevent a
nation from being dragged behind the Iron Curtain." See his comments in Nippon Times,
Aug. 29, 1953.
50. Nippon Times, Aug. 30, 1953. The size of the, National Safety Force was
finally set at 130,000. Presumably this number could be filled by voluntary enlistments,
and no revision was necessary.
51. Nippon Times, Sept. 28, 1953.
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The "future" was not too long in coming. Negotiations for Ameri-
can assistance culminated in economic aid pacts with the United States,
although, because of disagreement over the size of the projected
force, several months of discussion were necessary to arrange mutual
defense assistance. While the two governments agreed that an increased
number of military personnel was necessary, the Japanese wanted the
limits determined by Tokyo rather than by Washington. Although de-
pendent on military aid from the United States, the Yoshida Govern-
ment was prepared to drive a hard bargain."
In March 1954, the Government submitted two defensive measures
(the Defense Board Establishment Bill and the Self-Defense Force Bill)
and the -Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement to the Diet. 3 Favorable
action by the two chambers54 brought Japan a step closer to the realiza-
tion of an armed force capable of defending the nation. It was an em-
bryonic army and possessed a military character which could not be de-
52. As a possible concession to the United States, in view of the higher figures
set at Washington, the Japanese Government made public a new five year defense
program which would have increased the total forces to 270,000 men.
53. There was confusion surrounding the two proposals because of conflicting
statements by members of the Cabinet. The confusion in the Diet was apparent; but the
three conservative parties, who held the balance of power in the two houses, were
willing to accept any myth or fiction which would help them in creating something
stronger than the National Safety Force. If they had any question about a conflict
between the constitutional prohibition and the existence of self defense forces, they must
have resolved it by deciding that the troops would not be used abroad. Later, however,
it was decided that bombing enemy bases from which an aggressive action had been
launched against Japan, would be a defensive measure, and not in violation of Article 9.
See Nippon Times, March 17, 1954. The House of Councillors, while adopting the
measures, also resolved that the forces should not be used overseas "in light of the
provisions of the Constitution presently in force and the fervent peace-loving spirit
of our people." There was widespread apprehension that there would be external use
of the forces if the anti-Communist Bloc decided to take action during the battle of
Dien Bien Phu.
54. The combined strength of the conservative parties was more than the Socialists
and other leftist parties could face, and the defense measures and mutual assistance
pacts were pushed through to adoption. Not all Japanese Socialists fit the same pattern.
They had split into two groups, the Right and Left Socialists, at the time of the San
Francisco Peace Conference in 1951. The Right Socialists often talked as did Yoshida,
i.e., they too believed that economic stability was an important first factor, and any
program to rearm the nation had to stem from economic recovery. The Socialists of the
Right began to move closer to their Left brethren in 1953. They were willing to accept
a more heavily armed police force, but claimed that there was "an internationally
recognized limit to the equipment of a police organization." In view of the unique
character of Article 9, it is difficult to consider a situation comparable in history, and
certainly Grotius, Vattel, Pufendorff, and Bynkershoek could not anticipate and treat
of such a problem.
There was one Communist representative at the time. In August 1948, the Party
published a nine-point peace treaty program which included one recognizing "Japan's
right of self-defense and its right to remain free of any commitments that might involve
it in international disputes." The Communists had consistently opposed the renunciation
of war clause on the grounds that it was hypocritical, since the retention of the Tenno
system made Article 9 meaningless.
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nied. Instead of a National Police Force charged with ihternal securitr,
the renamed Self-Defense Force provided a safeguard against external
aggression. Another distinguishing feature was that all qualified Japa-
nese, regardless of participation in World War II, could occupy its posts,
civil or military.5"
During enactment of these defense measures, it appeared, for a time,
that Yoshida was going to change his policy against revision in order to
hold the support of the other conservative factions. His partisan, Eisaku
Sato, reported plans to set up a committee within the Liberal Party to
study proposals for revising the Constitution." In the following week,
Hatoyama offered to return to the fold if the Prime Minister would
publicly promise to establish a constitutional revision research commit-
tee." If the Prime Minister had carried through with the proposal for
revision, there would have been a clear change from the past. But Yo-
shida had not changed; setting up a committee to study revisiori was a
timely concession that did not bear fruit for his conservative supporters.
But for all intents and purposes Hatoyama and the splinter-Liberals had
returned to the fold.58 At this time Vice President Nixon arrived in
Tokyo. His presence was interpreted as a means by which the United
States would try to influence the Japanese to'revise their Constitution
and create a larger military establishment.59 As a result of domestic poli-
tics and the attitude of the United States it was reasonable to assume
that a major policy change would be made soon.
Hatoyama told a press conference that Yoshida had directed the
Legislative Bureau to study the various proposed amendments,6" and the
Prime Minister had given at least implied approval to several such under-
takings. Studies were being made by governmental agencies and by com-
mittees within the conservative groups but Yoshida treated each of these
as all previous measures had been treated-they never reached the floor
55. The Potsdam Proclamation had called for the permanent removal of those who
had been responsible for Japan's aggressive policies in the '30's and '40's. Up to this time
the Japanese had followed this stipulation closely; posts in the police force were restricted
to ex-officers of junior grades, and only civilians were placed in directorships. Nippon
Times, May 7, 1954.
56. Nippon Times, Oct. 8, 1953. The Constitution provides for popular referendum
on constitutional amendments, but the Diet still has not implemented this with legislation.
57. Nippon Times, Oct. 16, 1953.
58. Some of the men who had followed Hatoyama out of the Party maintained
their identity as "Japan-Liberals."
59. Nippon Times, Dec. 2, 1953.
60. Hatoyama may have believed that Yoshida had every intention of recommending
legislation which would implement the referendum provision, but more likely he was trying
to force the Prime Minister's hand. Hatoyama should have realized that Yoshida did
not want to accept responsibility for revision until there was popular support for such
an endeavor. For Hatoyama's statements see the Nippon Times, Dec. 8, 1953.
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of the House of Representatives.
According to the Prime Minister the proposed changes in the de-
fense establishment did not call for revision of the Constitution. Yoshida
told the Diet that he would honor the Showa Constitution. In response
to a Progressive suggestion that a new one be drafted, one that con-
formed to reality and was written from a "free standpoint," Yoshida
answered that it was "right and natural for us to abide by the Constitu-
tion we have whether it is a 'MacArthur Constitution' or not."'" Three
days later Yoshida returned to the Diet with the first critical opinion,
that he had ever expressed in public, of the Constitution. Yoshida an-
nounced that the document contained some points "unsuitable to Japan's
actual situation" and contrary to "the people's sentiments." 2  He ad-
mitted that "mistakes" had been made at the time the Constitution was
adopted, mistakes which were aggravated by the change in the inter-
national scene. This critical opinion was nothing more than what Nixon
had expressed two months previous.
Yoshida no longer believed that Article 9 stood in the way of the na-
tion's right to a "peace-preserving force.""3  There was no longer any
doubt in the minds of the members of the three conservative parties; the
provisions in Article 9 did not preclude rearming for self defense. Under
this interpretation of the Constitution, the Prime Minister did not have
to render further lip-service to Article 9, nor did he have to seek a defi-
nition for that vague phrase "war potential," a phrase which previously
had been erected as a bar to rearming.
By the adoption of these defense measures, on July 1, 1954, the
Japanese had completed the transition from complete demilitarization and
demobilization to the creation of a three-pronged self defense force.
There was admittedly a defense army that was to be expanded within a
five-year period to 200,000 men; there was a navy which now possessed
cruisers and destroyers in contrast to the much smaller vessels formerly
operated by the Coastal Safety Force. And for the first time since the
end of the Pacific War, Japan had a "self-defense" Air Force complete
with modern jet planes. 4 Former officers were now enrolled in the
61. Nippon Times, Jan. 30, 1953. Two weeks later the Liberal Party's Constitu-
tional Research Committee began its study. Yoshida maintained that the study was made
to determine "only whether the Constitution is proper to meet the new situation at home."
The Socialists claimed that revision was inevitable as the committee was "packed" with
pro-rearmament members. Their fears were groundless for no proposal was submitted
by the Government to revise the Constitution. Yoshida had conceded enough to gain
conservative support, but without giving the left-wing parties an opportunity to capitalize.
62. Nippon Times, Feb. 2, 1954.
63. Nippon Times, May 7, 1954.
64. Nippon Times, July 2, 1954.
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ranks of the new forces; the Deputy Chief of the Japanese Self-Defense
Air Force, Major General Tsuyoshi Sanagi, had been one of the planners
of the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. The revamped and better equipped
forces were primarily the result of Mutual Security.
Yoshida had to draw heavily upon the American arsenal to build
even these somewhat limited forces. Training in the use of the new
weapons of war was given at American installations. Some Japanese
were brought to the United States for schooling and then returned to
Japan to train others. Some crews came to the United States to learn
shiphandling and returned to Japan aboard ships which had been "de-
mothballed." Japan's transition was thus fostered and brought to com-
pletion by the initiator; the "demilitarizer" became the "militarizer."
III.
Perhaps there is an element of idealism and futility in demilitariza-
tion programs. After 1950 some Americans in high places assumed the
role of religious flagellantes and scourged themselves before the world
for the sin committed in 1945. There were denials that the job which
was done was aonecessary one, and even great men began to rewrite his-
tory to bring their own roles into more favorable light in view of the
post-war events. In spite of the failure to correctly evaluate our Red
allies and to predict the course of the future, the scourge is not necessary.
Hindsight has the advantage over foresight. With our knowledge of
post-war events, and especially the deterioration of relations between East
and West, we can say we made a mistake in 1945 and 1946 in the occu-
pation policies which we framed for Germany and Japan. But at the
same time it must be recognized that the judgments made in the imme-
diate post-war period were based on the knowledge then in our possession.
The United States had definite goals in mind. It is easy now to
characterize the goals as idealistic and utopian, but they had meaning
then, and still retain some significance. The pattern was set in the 1941
Atlantic meeting aboard the USS Augusta, with the famed four free-
doms, and reached its maximum development at Potsdam. The Allies
had their eyes wide open when they decided to demilitarize and disarm
Japan and Germany.
The heinous crime of Nazism and Japanese militarism called for
punishment. The tremendous sacrifices in manpower and material were
not made so that the newly-created United Nations could officiate as
godparents for the offspring of Fascism and militarism. It is inconceiv-
able that anything less than complete destruction of the military potential
of both nations would have satisfied the neighbors of Germany and
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Japan. The French thought of the three German invasions in seventy
years; Belgian soil and neutrality had been violated twice within three
decades and the Dutch, Norwegians, Bohemians, Yugoslavs, and Greeks
had known the effectiveness of Blitzkrieg and the viciousness of racism.
The Japanese had their victims as well. The Chinese, Filipinos, and
other Asians who had been subjected to Japanese aggression were no
more inclined toward magnanimity than their European counterparts.
The Allies' task was clear. Punishment had to be meted out to
those who had instigated the crimes against humanity, and the Allies had
to prevent a renaissance of that extremist nationalism which had pro-
vided the medium for militarism in Japan and Germany.
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